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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a direct action brought by an injured party against

the insurance company and claim representative of the alleged tortfeasor. The District Court
dismissed the action brought by Michael A. Dahmer (the injured party) ("Dahmer") against State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm Mutual") and claim representative
David E. Bice ("Bice"). State Farm Mutual is the insurance company who insured Jonathan
Blackburn (the alleged tortfeasor) ("Blackburn") for Dahmer's personal injury claim arising out
of an automobile accident.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
State Farm Mutual adds the following to Dahmer' s "Course of Proceedings" (for which

there are no record citations): 1
Dahmer filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on May 5, 2015. (R., p. 11.) He
sued Blackburn for personal injuries, alleging negligence in relation to an automobile accident.
(R., pp. 11-15.) He also sued State Farm Mutual and Bice alleging that Bice violated unnamed

statutes and acted with criminal intent and malice in reviewing and ultimately denying Dahmer's
personal injury claim against Blackburn and that State Farm Mutual knew, or should have
known, of Bice's violation of these unnamed criminal statutes, which criminal actions allegedly
caused Dahmer civil damages. (Id.)
This Respondents' Brief addresses only those issues, facts and course of proceedings relating to
the appeal by Dahmer from dismissal of State Farm Mutual and Bice. This Brief does not
address Dahmer's appeal relating to Blackburn.
1

1

On June 17, 2015, State Farm Mutual and Bice filed an Answer, moved to dismiss the
Complaint against them and sought sanctions. (R., pp. 16-20, 21-23 and 24-26.) The primary
grounds for dismissal were that a third-party personal injury plaintiff cannot sue the insurance
company of the alleged tortfeasor and there is no cognizable cause of action against the claim
representative of an insurer. (R., pp. 21-26.) State Farm Mutual moved for sanctions pursuant to
Rule 1 l(a)(l) and/or sought attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and§ 41-1839(4) for
bringing a frivolous lawsuit. (R., pp. 24-26.) A Memorandum in Support of the Motions to
Dismiss and Motions for Sanctions was to be filed within fourteen ( 14) days of the Motions. (R.,
pp. 24-26; 21-23.)
Before the supporting Memorandum was filed, Dahmer filed his First Consolidated
Memorandum in Opposition of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims. (R., pp. 2732.) On June 29, 2015, State Farm Mutual and Bice filed a joint Memorandum in Support of the
Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Sanctions. (R., pp. 33-40.) Dahmer filed his Second
Consolidated Memorandum in Opposition of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims
on July 16, 2015. (R., pp. 45-50.) On August 10, 2015, State Farm Mutual and Bice filed a joint
Reply Brief in Support of the Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Sanctions. (R., pp. 51-58.)
On August 18, 2015, State Farm Mutual filed an Errata to its Reply Brief and corrected the
record to indicate that while collateral estoppel was originally raised as an affirmative defense in
the Answer and was initially raised in the Motions to Dismiss, it was not pursued in the
supporting Memorandum as a basis for dismissal. (R., pp. 59-61.)

2

The hearing on the Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Sanctions was held on August
20, 2015. (R., p. 3.) On August 26, 2015, the District Court issued its Order Granting the
Motions to Dismiss. (R., pp. 62-63.)
Pursuant to the District Court's request at the August 20, 2015 hearing, State Farm
Mutual submitted a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motions for Sanctions. (R.,
pp. 64-67.) On September 15, 2015, Dahmer filed his Brief at the Request of the Court
Regarding a Good Faith Position Regarding the Dismissal of the Defendants State Farm Mutual
and David Bice and for Elimination of Sanctions. (R., p. 4.)2 On October 29, 2015, Plaintiff
filed a Motion for Reconsideration Regarding a Good Faith Brief at the Request of the Court on
the Dismissal of the Defendants State Farm Mutual and David Bice and for a Elimination of
Sanctions. (R., p. 4.)3
On December 21, 2015, the District Court signed an Order Re: Motion for Sanctions and
Motion for Reconsideration, taking both under consideration. (R., pp. 68-70.) This Order was
filed December 23, 2015. (Id.) A Memorandum and Order Granting Defendants' Motion for
Sanctions was signed and filed on December 23, 2015. (R., pp. 77-83.) On that same date, the
court signed and issued a Memorandum and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration. (R., pp. 71 -76.)
On January 5, 2016, State Farm Mutual and Bice filed a joint Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees with supporting Affidavit. (R, pp. 84-94.) On January 22, 2016, Dahmer filed a

2
3

The record citation is to the ROA. The Brief is not part of the record.
The record citation is to the ROA. The Brief is not part of the record.
3

document entitled Objection to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss "With Prejudice", Proposed
Order, Sanctions, and Attorney's Fees. (R., pp. 95-96.) It requested "minimal sanctions and
reduced attorney fees." Id. On January 29, 2016, State Farm Mutual and Bice filed a response.
(R., pp. 97-99.) A hearing was held on the amount of costs and fees on March 24, 2016. (R., p.

6.) On April 21, 2016, the court issued its Order on Sanctions awarding costs and fees in the
sum of $7,214.50 to bear interest until fully paid. (R., pp. 100-102.) In this Order the District
Court declined to enter a final judgment under Rule 54(b) until the action against Blackburn was
completed. (Id., p. 101.)
On December 1, 2016, the jury signed a Special Verdict determining that Blackburn was
not negligent. (R., pp. 191-192.) With the conclusion of the suit against Blackburn, final
judgment was entered on February 7, 2017, dismissing the Complaint against all parties with
prejudice and awarding $7,863.81 for attorney fees, costs and accrued interest to State Farm
Mutual and Bice. (R., pp. 193-194.)
Dahmer timely filed a Notice of Appeal on March 10, 2017. (R., pp. 195-196.)

C.

Statement of Facts.
State Farm Mutual adds the following to Dahmer' s "Statement of Facts":
On June 13, 2013, a motor vehicle accident occurred when vehicles being driven by

Dahmer and Blackburn collided. (R., pp. 13-14.) Dahmer made a claim against Blackburn for
personal injuries arising out of the accident. (R., p. 13.) Blackburn was insured by State Farm
Mutual. (Id.) Bice was a claims adjuster for State Farm Mutual handling the personal injury
claim made by Dahmer against Blackburn. (R., pp. 11, 13.)
4

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Whether State Farm Mutual and Bice are entitled to attorney fees incurred on

appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule, Rule 11.2 or Idaho Code § 12-121?

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
A.

State Farm Mutual and Bice are Entitled to Attorney Fees Incurred on Appeal
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule, Rule 11.2.
Sanctions, in the form of attorney fees, can be imposed upon the person who signed the

notice of appeal, a brief or other document filed in support of an appeal. (Idaho Appellate Rule,
Rule 1 l.2(a).) This Court has construed I.AR. 11.2 as follows:
The attorney's or party's signature on a document constitutes two substantive
certifications: (a) that to the best of the signor's knowledge, information, and
belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal
of existing law, and (b) that it [the document] is not interposed for any improper
purpose. Both certifications must be accurate in order to comply with the rule. If
either of them is not accurate, then the document would be signed in violation of
the rule.

Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Board of County Com'rsfor Fremont County, 156 Idaho 449,453,328
P.3d 429,433 (2014) (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Attorney
fees can be awarded as sanctions on appeal when a party or attorney violates either (a) the
frivolous filings clause, or (b) the improper purpose clause. Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,
987, 342 P.3d 907,914 (2015). Sanctions are awardable independently under either clause. Id.

5

Like his lawsuit, Dahmer's appeal violates both clauses. 4 Dahmer was advised, shortly
after he filed his Complaint, that clear and long-standing case law precluded him from bringing a
direct action against State Farm Mutual and that to continue prosecuting the action could lead to
sanctions against him. (R., p. 87.) Dahmer was again advised, through the joint Memorandum
in Support of the Motions to Dismiss, that there was no legal or factual basis for his suit against
State Farm Mutual or Bice. (R., pp. 33-40; 81.) At that time, he was provided with citations to
long-standing case law directly on point and further provided with the Rule 11 bases for
sanctions because of his continued prosecution of the frivolous lawsuit. (Id.) In reply to
Dahmer's opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, Dahmer was advised that his arguments were
the same as those previously rejected by this Court. (R., pp. 51-58.) After granting the Motions
to Dismiss the Complaint, the District Court informed Dahmer that his lawsuit violated both the
frivolous filings clause and the improper purpose clause.
The court understands that Dahmer was acting pro per. However, Dahmer was
informed of the mountain of case-law against his position on 06/03/15 (via a letter
and proposed stipulation for dismissal), on 06/17/15 (via the defendants' motions
to dismiss, as well as their Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial), on
06/29/15 (via the defendants' memorandum in support of their motions to
dismiss), and again on 08/10/15 (via yet another brief in support of the
defendants' motions to dismiss). Despite receiving this information, Dahmer
continued to sign and file documents that argued his ability to do exactly what
Idaho courts have repeatedly rejected.
Therefore, this court finds in its discretion that Dahmer's allegations and
contentions against State Farm and Bice, signed and filed by Dahmer, were not
~

Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as litigants represented by an attorney
and this Court has previously awarded attorney fees against a prose litigant that pursued an
appeal frivolously. Twin Falls County v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442,445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046
(2003).
6

warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and resulted in unnecessary delay and
needless increase in the cost of litigation in this action. The court also finds that
as Dahmer was informed of the no-direct-action rule numerous times, he either
knew or had reason to know that such was the case. Consequently, as Dahmer
failed to exercise reasonableness in continuing to assert his direct-action claims,
sanctions under I.R.C.P. l l(a)(l) are appropriate.
(R., pp. 81-82 (footnote omitted).)
Despite being advised on numerous occasions of "[c]lear, long-established case-law
[that] prohibits a third party from bringing such a direct action against an insurance company"
and "the mountain of case-law against his position", Dahmer has persisted in this appeal "to
argue [] his ability to do exactly what Idaho courts have repeatedly rejected". This appeal also
continues to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.
Dahmer brings nothing new in the way of facts, case law or arguments that might warrant
extension, modification, or reversal of the existing law that is so contrary to his position.
Instead, he regurgitates the same frivolous arguments he made before the District Court. For
instance, Dahmer argues on appeal he should be allowed to proceed against State Farm Mutual
and Bice because he has alleged an independent cause of action, outside of any contractual
relationship, and that State Farm Mutual and Bice are tortfeasors, not merely the tortfeasor's
insurer. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 12, 15.) As the District Court held: "Dahmer argues that he can
bring a direct action against both State Farm and Bice because they are separate 'tortfeasors.'
However, he alleges that their tortious acts were in reviewing and ultimately denying his claims.
The court finds this argument without merit and unreasonable." (R., p. 82, footnote 2.)

7

State Farm Mutual and Bice request that they be awarded attorney fees on appeal under
Rule 11.2 based on Dahmer' s violation of either or both the frivolous filings clause and the
improper purpose clause.

B.

State Farm Mutual and Bice are Entitled to Attorney Fees Incurred on Appeal
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121.
Alternatively, State Farm Mutual and Bice seek an award of attorney fees on appeal

pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. Normally, in a suit against an insurance company, its
exclusive remedy for attorney fees on appeal is Idaho Code§ 41-1839(4). However, Idaho Code
§ 41-1839(4) only applies when the action involves an action between an insurer and an insured
and the dispute arises under a policy of insurance. Hestead v. CNA Supply, 152 Idaho 575,581,
272 P.3d 547,553 (2012); Lopez v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 148 Idaho 515,520,
224 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2010). This appeal involves neither an action between an insured and an
insurer and does not arise out of a dispute under a policy of insurance. Dahmer is not insured by
State Farm Mutual. The dispute arises out of an automobile accident. Consequently, the
exclusivity of Idaho Code§ 41-1839(4) does not apply. Therefore, in the alternative to an award
of sanctions under Rule 11.2, State Farm Mutual and Bice are entitled to attorney fees on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, which allows for attorney fees when "the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." For the same reasons as
discussed above regarding Rule 11.2, this case was brought and has been pursued on appeal
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.

8

This Court previously awarded attorney fees on appeal to an insurance company when it
affirmed a dismissal of a direct action against an insurance company by a third-party. In
Graham v. State Farm Mutual, this Court awarded fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121 on
the grounds that the case was without foundation, the law was well settled in this area, and there
was no compelling reason to reconsider this Court's prior decisions. Graham v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 611,614, 67 P.3d 90, 93 (2003). For the same reasons, attorney fees
on appeal should be awarded to State Farm Mutual and Bice pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standards of Review.
1.

Standard of Review for Granting Motions to Dismiss.

In reviewing a district court's order granting motions to dismiss, the standard of review is
the same as that used in summary judgments. Rim View Trout Co. v. Idaho Dept. of Water
Resources, 119 Idaho 676,677,809 P.2d 1155, 1156 (1991). The standard of review on appeal
from an order granting summary judgment is the same standard that is used by the District Court
in ruling on the motion. Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on
file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 232, 61 P.3d 585,589
(2002).

9

2.

Standard of Review for Imposition of Sanctions.

The standard of review for an appellate court reviewing the District Court's imposition of
sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 is one of abuse of discretion. Gubler v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 112,
113-14, 867 P.2d 986, 987-88 (1994). In making a determination of whether a trial court abused
its discretion, the Court considers: (1) whether the District Court correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the District Court acted within the boundaries of this discretion
and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
whether the District Court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Rockefeller v. Grabow,
139 Idaho 538, 545, 82 P.3d 450,457 (2003).

B.

Analysis.
1.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Dahmer's Lawsuit Against State
Farm Mutual and Bice on the Grounds that it Violates the Long-Standing
No-Direct-Action Rule.

Dahmer was involved in an automobile accident with Blackbum. (R., pp. 13-14.)
Dahmer filed a personal injury suit against Blackbum. (Id.) Rather than limit his Complaint to a
personal injury action against Blackburn, Dahmer also sued Blackburn's liability insurer, State
Farm Mutual, and the claim representative who handled Dahmer's bodily injury claim against
Blackbum. There is no direct action against another person's insurance company (or, by
extension, its claim representative) as a matter of long established and clear Idaho law.
In Idaho there is not, and never has been, a right of an injured party to sue the insurance
company of the alleged tortfeasor. Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of

Idaho, 132 Idaho 318,322,971 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1998) ("A third party may not directly sue an
10

insurance company in an attempt to obtain the coverage allegedly due the insurer's
policyholder."). Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West Inc., 101 Idaho 783,791,621 P.2d
399, 407 (1980) ("[i]t is well established that absent a contractual or statutory provision
authorizing the action, an insurance carrier cannot be sued directly and cannot be joined as a
party defendant.") This rule has been continuously upheld. See, e.g., Downing v. Travelers Ins.

Co., 107 Idaho 511, 691 P.2d 375 (1984) (wife of deceased train engineer, who did not establish
her right to any death benefits under collective bargaining agreement, could not maintain direct
action against insurer on theory that she was a third-party beneficiary under a group policy
providing coverage for liability imposed upon railroad companies by various collective
bargaining agreements).
In Hettwer v. Farmers Insurance Co., 118 Idaho 373, 797 P.2d 81 (1990), the Hettwers
attempted, in a personal injury action, to join the insurer of the tortfeasor based on allegations
against the insurer of intentional delay of payment of their personal injury claim. This Court
rejected Hettwers' direct action against the tortfeasor's insurer, stating that an action for bad faith
against an insurance carrier, as it was first announced in White v. Unigard Mutual Insurance, 112
Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986), would not be extended to third-party claimants. Hettwer, 118
Idaho at 373-74, 797 P.2d at 81-82.
Subsequently, in Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 980 P.2d 566
( 1999), this Court held that an employee of the Idaho Department of Transportation could not
sue the Department's surety for bad faith in dealing with Van Tine's injuries because he was a
third party to the insured and insurer relationship, stating:
11

In the present case, the first party insured of the SIF is the Idaho
Department of Transportation, not Van Tine. Thus, because Van
Tine is a third party claimant, even out of the context of the
worker's compensation law, he would not be able to maintain a
bad faith action against the SIF.

Van Tine, 132 Idaho at 908, 980 P.2d at 572.
In Brooksby v. Geico General Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 546, 286 P.3d 182 (2012) (abrogated
on other grounds. Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 18, 394 P.3d 54, 61 (2017)), plaintiff Brooks by
was a passenger riding in a car driven by her father who was an insured through a policy issued
by GEICO. Brooksby, 153 Idaho at 547, 286 P.3d at 183. Brooksby alleged that her father
negligently injured her in an automobile accident. Id. She made a claim against her father under
the GEICO policy, which GEICO denied under the policy's "household exclusion" clause. Id.
Brooksby filed suit against her father but rather then pursuing that lawsuit, she filed a separate
action against GEICO seeking a declaratory judgment establishing coverage under the policy,
including a determination that Idaho law prohibits the household exclusion. Id. GEICO filed a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) arguing that Brooksby lacked standing and therefore
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. The district court dismissed the
Complaint for lack of standing based on Idaho's long-standing rule that an injured party has no
direct cause of action against her tortfeasor' s liability insurer absent some statutory or
contractual authorization. Id.
This Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Complaint against the insurance
company finding that "[w]e have repeatedly reaffirmed the no-direct-action rule: 'absent a
contractual or statutory provision authorizing the action, and insurance carrier cannot be sued
12

directly and cannot be joined as a party defendant."' Brooksby, 153 Idaho at 548, 286 P.3d at
184. (citing Graham, 138 Idaho at 613, 67 P.3d at 92.) This Court reasoned that the foundation
for the well-established, no-direct-action rule "is that an insurance policy 'is a matter of contract
between the insurer and the insured,' and a third party 'allegedly injured by the insured is not a
party to the insurance contract and has no rights under it."' Brooksby, 153 Idaho at 548, 286
P.3d at 184 (quoting Hartman v. United Heritage Property and Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 199,
108 P.3d 340, 346 (2005)). This Court noted that Brooksby did not allege that any statute had
abrogated the no-direct-action rule and that Brooksby had no rights against, or relationship, with
GEICO whatsoever. Id.
In the District Court and on appeal, Dahmer has failed to allege a statute authorizing a
direct action against State Farm Mutual or its claim representative. Nor could he. There is none.
Dahmer has failed to allege any contract provision authorizing a direct action. Nor could he.
There is none. Regardless, Dahmer is not a party to the insurance contract between State Farm
Mutual and Blackburn. Dahmer's only relationship to the insured/insurer relationship is that he
is suing the tortfeasor's insurance company because of the way it handled his personal injury
claim. This is the exact relationship, however, that this Court has repeatedly said cannot support
a suit.
Aside and apart from the no-direct-action rule, adjustors are not subject to liability to
insureds, let alone a third party injured claimant. See ADJUSTORS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO
LIABILITY TO INSUREDS FOR MISHANDLING CLAIMS, 15 Bad Faith Law Report 123 ( 1999). Claim
adjustors owe no tort duty to insureds because the adjustor is subject to the insurer's control and
13

the insurer, not the adjustor, has the ultimate power to pay or deny a claim; the adjustor does not
have a contractual relationship with the insured and does not have the opportunity to limit his
exposure by contract; and the imposition of a tort duty owed to the insured places the adjustor in
a conflict of interest, owing conflicting duties to his insurance employer and to the insured. See

Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Services, Inc., 72 Cal.App.4th 249, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 799
(1999).
For the reasons above, an insured cannot sue his own adjustor, even when adjusting a
first party claim made under the insured's own policy. Dahmer is not even an insured of State
Farm Mutual. He is one step removed. He is attempting to sue the adjustor of someone else's
insurance company. There is no legal basis for doing so.
Dahmer's suit against State Farm Mutual and Bice was a violation of the no-direct-action
rule. He has no rights against, or relationship with, State Farm Mutual or Bice. Dahmer has no
standing to contest State Farm Mutual's decisions regarding his personal injury claim against
Blackburn. The District Court's dismissal of State Farm Mutual and Bice should be affirmed.
Dahmer argues on appeal (as he did before the District Court) that he has alleged a
separate and independent cause of action against State Farm Mutual and Bice as independent
tortfeasors, outside of any contractual relationship or agency, which places them outside the nodirect-action rule. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 12, 15.) Dahmer' s Complaint, however, does no such
thing. Dahmer alleges that State Farm Mutual and Bice violated criminal statutes 5 and acted with

Dahmer does not identify in his Complaint what statutes were allegedly violated. He does,
however, identify in briefing that "State Farm Adjuster Bice committed a criminal misdemeanor

5
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criminal intent and malice in reviewing and ultimately denying his personal injury claim against
Blackburn. (R., p. 14.) The Complaint allegations against both State Farm Mutual and Bice
arise out of Dahmer's personal injury claim against Blackburn. These allegations are no
different than those raised and dismissed in Hettwer and Brooksby. These allegations are
precisely the type of allegations that have been determined to be an ill-advised direct action
against the insurance company of the alleged tortfeasor. The case law has extensively explored
the precise relationship presented here - the relationship between an injured party (Dahmer) and
the alleged tortfeasor (Blackburn) and the alleged tortfeasor's insurer (State Farm Mutual) and
determined that the no-direct-action rule applies. See, e.g., Hettwer, 118 Idaho at 373-74, 797
P.2d at 81-82.
Dahmer also argues on appeal (as he did before the District Court) that: (1) counsel for
State Farm Mutual and Bice filed a false Answer claiming collateral estoppel as defenses in
violation of Rule 11; (2) that the prototype e-filing system had problems which denied him due
process; and (3) that denying his right to proceed with all claims against all Defendants or to
proceed separately against each Defendant denied him equal protection. These alleged errors are
made without record citations, and are not supported by argument or authority.
Dahmer does not explain, nor provide record citations, authority or argument why raising
affirmative defenses in an Answer makes the Answer false, violates Rule 11 or creates reversible
in the State of Idaho in violation of Idaho Code §54-1201, et sec [sic], specifically §541202(6)definitions and and [sic] §54-1222(10) Penalty." (Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) This statute
applies to engineers and surveyors and the licensing of both. Idaho Code § 54-1201. As best as
can be surmised, but without any record support, it is believed that Dahmer feels Bice was acting
as an unlicensed engineer while adjusting his personal injury claim against Blackburn.
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error. (R., pp. 16-20.) Affirmative defenses are neither admissions nor denials. Although the
initial Motions to Dismiss preserved collateral estoppel as a potential ground for dismissal, it was
not pursued in the later filed Memorandum in Support of the Motions to Dismiss. (R., pp. 21,
25.) State Farm Mutual and Bice corrected any misunderstanding regarding mention of this
affirmative defense in the Motions to Dismiss in an Errata to its Reply Memorandum in Support
of the Motions to Dismiss and for Sanctions. (R., pp. 59-61.) 6 Regardless, Dahmer provides no
record support, arguments, or authority showing how raising this affirmative defense creates
reversible error in the dismissal of State Farm Mutual or Bice under the no-direct-action rule.
This Court does not consider assignments of error not supported by argument and authority in
the opening brief, and citations to the relevant parts of the appellate record supporting the
argument. Cummings v. Stephens, 157 Idaho 348,362,336 P.3d 281,295 (2014); I.AR., Rule
35(a)(6).
Dahmer argues that the prototype e-filing system in place at the time and the dismissal of
State Farm Mutual and Bice violated his due process and equal protection rights under the
Constitution. These arguments were not developed at the District Court. On appeal, he has
failed to provide any authority or argument to support a violation of his constitutional rights or
how the alleged problems with the prototype e-filing system or not being allowed to proceed

The affirmative defense states "That the Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from alleging liability
because facts of liability were determined in a prior proceeding conducted in Arbitration Forums,
Inc." (R., p. 19.) This affirmative defense is based on an Intercompany Arbitration between
Dahmer's insurance company and Blackburn's insurance company (State Farm Mutual) where it
was determined that Dahmer was more negligent than Blackburn (consistent with the jury's
verdict at trial). (R., p. 55, footnote 3.)

6
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affected his constitutional rights or, more importantly, how these problems created reversible
error in the dismissal of State Farm Mutual and Bice under long-standing Idaho law regarding
the no-direct-action rule.
Dahmer's arguments on appeal should not be considered. Regardless, they do not
support reversal of the dismissal of the Complaint against State Farm Mutual and Bice.

2.

The District Court Properly Awarded Sanctions in the Form of Attorney
Fees and Costs.

The sum total of Dahmer's position on appeal that sanctions should be overturned is:
With regard to sanctions, the imposed should be denied. Defendants' own case
law citations. It was the legislative intent in LC. 41-1839 et. sec. [sic], that "serial
litigators" be punished for clogging the courts with trivial and non-sense based
claims. This legislative intent was their solutions to "serial litigators". State
Farm and Bice cannot have unqualified immunity from the courts and the
laws of the State of Idaho.
Appellant's Brief, p. 17. (Bold in original.) Dahmer provides no cogent argument (or any
argument at all) and provides no authority for overturning the sanctions awarded by the District
Court under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l l(a)(l). This Court does not consider assignments
of error not supported by arguments or authority. Cummings, 157 Idaho at 362, 336 P.3d at 295.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 (a)( 1), allows for an award of sanctions for
bringing an action that is not grounded in fact and is not warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or is interposed for an
improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation. I.R.C.P., Rule 1 l(a)(l). This Court has stated the following with regard to
plaintiffs who bring the type of action brought by Dahmer:
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We have repeatedly reaffirmed the no-direct-action rule: "absent a contractual or
statutory provision authorizing the action, an insurance carrier cannot be sued
directly and cannot be joined as a party defendant." Graham v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 611, 613, 67 P.3d 90, 92 (2003) (quoting Pocatello
Indus. Park Co. v. Steele W., Inc., 101 Idaho 783,791,621 P.2d 399,407 (1980));
accord Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 199, 108
P.3d 340, 346 (2005); Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of
Idaho, 132 Idaho 318,322,971 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1998); Downing v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 511,514,691 P.2d 375,378 (1984).
Brooksby, 153 Idaho at 548, 286 P.3d at 184.
Despite the repeated reaffirmation of the long-standing, no-direct-action rule, Dahmer
violated that rule in the same manner as the Hettwers did in Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co., and
Brooksby did in Brooksby v. GEICO, and Graham did in Graham v. State Farm when they
attempted to sue the tortfeasor's insurer. This Court in Graham v. State Farm Mutual upheld the
District Court's award of attorney fees against Graham (albeit, not as a Rule 11 sanction) on the
basis that the questions raised in the context of the no-direct-action rule were not novel, were
governed by clear Idaho precedent and, therefore, Graham's claim was unreasonable and without
foundation. Graham, 138 Idaho at 614, 67 P.3d at 93.
Granting sanctions is a matter of discretion by the district court. Gubler, 112 Idaho at
113-14, 867 P.2d at 987-988. Here, the District Court correctly perceived the issue of sanctions
as one of discretion. (R., p. 81.) ("Therefore, this court finds in its discretion that Dahmer's
allegations and contentions against State Farm and Bice, signed and filed by Dahmer, were not
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and resulted in unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost of litigation in
this action.) Based on clear and long-standing case law addressing the no-direct-action rule in
18

factual contexts similar to that presented in this matter, the District Court acted within the
boundaries of this discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards. In addition, the
District Court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. (R., pp. 81-82.) ("The court also
finds that as Dahmer was informed of the no-direct-action rule numerous times, he either knew
or had reason to know that such was the case. Consequently, as Dahmer failed to exercise
reasonableness in continuing to assert his direct-action claims, sanctions under I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(l)
are appropriate.") (footnote omitted.) Dahmer has failed to make any showing that the District
Court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions against Dahmer in the form of attorney fees
and costs. In fact, the District Court did not abuse its discretion.

V. CONCLUSION
The District Court's dismissal of State Farm Mutual and Bice and its award of sanctions
should be affirmed. State Farm Mutual and Bice should be awarded costs and fees on appeal.
DATED this

J

day of November, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

A. Thomson,
the firm
ttorneys for Respondents State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and
David E. Bice
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